(Editor’s Note: The following is a commentary last January 5, from Filipina Prof. Anna Malindug Uy, a well-known and highly respected scholar and analyst. We are republishing it here due to its relevance highlighted by the shallow arguments and intellectual dishonesty shown by Sen. Francisco ‘Kiko’ Pangilinan in relation to Taiwan and China. Pangilinan’s position clearly promotes the pro-Imperialist agenda of some quarters in the region by recognizing the ‘independence’ of Taiwan, which is an integral part of the territory of China).
THERE is a difference between sounding tough and being strategically sound. Senator Kiko Pangilinan’s recent outbursts against China, particularly his responses to the Chinese Embassy, manage to miss that distinction entirely.
What we get instead is a performance: legally sloppy, strategically confused and noisy, and internally inconsistent. Worse, it weakens the Philippines’ strongest positions by muddling and botching issues that should never have been mixed in the first place.
The BIG conflation: “One China” ≠ “China’s South China Sea claims.”
At the heart of Kiko Pangilinan’s argument is a fundamental conflation: the Taiwan question and the South China Sea (SCS) dispute are not the same issue, not governed by the same law, and not resolved in the same forums. Treating them as interchangeable may earn applause on social media, but it collapses under the most basic legal scrutiny.
Taiwan is a sovereignty-recognition issue. Whereas the SCS dispute is a maritime entitlements issue. That distinction is not academic hair-splitting—it is the backbone of international law.
The Philippines’ claims in the SCS are primarily not claims of territorial sovereignty, but of sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Taiwan, by contrast, is a question of statehood, recognition, and civil war legacies, governed by political agreements and diplomatic practice—not UNCLOS.
Yet Pangilinan casually barters them as if they were chips on the same table: I respect the One China policy; therefore, China should respect our EEZ.
That’s not how the law works. It’s not how diplomacy works either. It’s rhetorical wishful thinking masquerading as principle.
Pangilinan’s credibility deficit
Moreover, Kiko’s “I respect the One China Policy” while doing photo ops with Taipei makes the hypocrisy problem glaring. Pangilinan insists he respects the One China Policy while having repeatedly visited Taiwan and held public meetings, as framed by Taiwanese authorities, which they described as official political engagement. One does not need to be a Beijing hardliner to see the contradiction.
Taiwan’s news agency CNA reported that Pangilinan visited Taiwan (October 30–November 4, 2025) in his capacity as Chair of a Philippine Senate committee (Agriculture) and that he would meet “government officials and legislators” to discuss strengthening ties.
CNA also reported that Taiwan’s vice president received Pangilinan and his wife at the Presidential Office, explicitly describing deepening the Taiwan–Philippines partnership.
CNA further reported that Taiwan’s foreign minister met with him and used the occasion to push for agreements and cooperation, framing Taiwan and the Philippines as “democratic partners” in the “first island chain.”
Thus, Kiko can’t simultaneously insist he “respects One China Policy,” and behave in ways Taiwan publicly markets as quasi-official political engagement. That’s blatant hypocrisy and dishonesty.
Kiko may call it “agriculture cooperation” or “economic exchange,” but in signaling terms, it’s still: “I’m engaging Taipei as a political interlocutor.” Beijing will obviously read it that way, because Taipei itself is broadcasting it that way.
Thus, the loophole in Kiko’s own posture is simple: He’s using “One China Policy” as a disclaimer, while practicing “Taiwan engagement” as a performance. That’s not statesmanship. That’s have-your-cake diplomacy.
Thus, Kiko cannot claim fidelity to the One China Policy while acting in ways that Taipei itself advertises as quasi-official recognition. Beijing does not need propaganda to challenge this inconsistency; Pangilinan supplies the evidence himself. The disclaimer (“I respect One China”) is neutralized by the behavior that follows it.
This is not a question of whether Philippine legislators should visit Taiwan—they can, and many do. It is about CREDIBILITY. Kiko cannot invoke the One China Policy as a shield while simultaneously undermining it through signaling. That is not diplomacy; it is strategic duplicity in diplomacy.