‘Power of the Purse’ and Congressional Influence

THE public often calls for the investigation of lawmakers suspected of collusion with private contractors. In his 4th State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos Jr. vowed to probe such links, especially over the spate of heavy floodings about ready to submerge his administration from public anger and frustration.

This has reignited debate on Congress’ power over the nation’s finances and the laws designed to safeguard public funds. Reports of unfinished flood control projects and suspicious transactions have heightened concerns about the integrity of legislators and their ties to favored contractors.

Congress as Custodian of Public Funds

The 1987 Constitution vests Congress with the ‘Power of Purse:’ “No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” Congress exercises both the authority to raise revenue through taxation and to determine how such funds are spent. Appropriation extends beyond setting amounts. It specifies the exact purpose for which public funds may be used.

The result of such extralegal influence on the project award process is the deterioration of material quality and the misuse of disbursed public funds.

In principle, lawmakers should have no influence over which contractors secure government projects. Several laws exist to minimize conflicts of interest: first, Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards (RA 6713): Prohibits public officials from holding private business interests upon assumption of office; second, Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019): Penalizes officials who grant unwarranted benefits through partiality, bad faith, or negligence, and bars them from having direct or indirect financial interests in government transactions; and third, Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 95(c): Prohibits contractors with ongoing government projects from donating to candidates. While on its face, the law provides measures to prevent corruption over public works, such regulations prove idealistic that is, they fail to address our present reality.

The Reality of Congressional Influence

Ideally, projects are implemented by the various agencies such as the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Department of Transportation (DOTr), and Local Government Units (LGUs) in accordance with the New Government Procurement Reform Act.

Under this law, competitive bidding rules apply and must go to the ‘Lowest Calculated Responsive Bid’ for infrastructure projects, or the ‘Highest Rated Responsive Bid’ for consulting services. Finally, oversight rests with the Bids and Awards Committee of each agency, not Congress.

Although a legal iron curtain exists between the lawmakers and public works projects, legislators retain indirect influence.

During budget deliberations, representatives lobby for projects in their districts, which then get included in the General Appropriations Act. Although the relevant government agency formally handles procurement, lawmakers almost always “recommend” contractors to agency officials. These suggestions, though non-binding, carry weight since legislators hold sway over future budget allocations and oversight hearings.

The result of such extralegal influence on the project award process is the deterioration of material quality and the misuse of disbursed public funds.

President Marcos’ directive to expose erring government officials has already produced results, as seen in recent reports on an unfinished river protection structure in Calumpit, Bulacan, and the ongoing controversy over Senate President Francis Joseph “Chiz” G. Escudero’s alleged receipt of campaign donations from a government contractor.

However, this measure remains remedial rather than preventive. Without the faithful execution of laws specifically enacted to curb such practices, these controversies will continue to unravel, and floodwaters will inevitably come to submerge us once again.